1. What are (or should be) the needs and objectives of the owners of Xantrex at this juncture? What are the
risks and opportunities available from additional investment in Xantrex at this time from the perspectives of Xantrex and the investors?
Xantrex’s goals are to repay the FBDB loan and finance expansion into new markets. Their key problem is that sales are higher than expected and so carrying costs on the FBDB loan are too great (so Xantrex’s options are to pay off the principal—$600K—plus the NPV of the interest premiums i.e. $206,146 right now, or to pay the principal plus monthly installments for 3 years).
From the investor’s perspective, the key risk is that the company may be unable to successfully expand, meet the aggressive sales targets it has set, and return value to the investors according to the desired timeline. There is a risk that the company valuation will not be high enough to yield desired return upon an exit event (e.g. IPO, sale of company, or sale of investor interest). However, there is a clear opportunity to capitalize on this rapidly growing company by investing at an early, relatively cheap stage. Xantrex has already significantly exceeded sales estimates, indicating that there is the potential for further rapid growth. Furthermore, Xantrex is currently the dominant player in the market outside North America, although other competitors are entering the global marketplace. There is therefore a window of investment opportunity at this stage that would help Xantrex retain and expand its global dominance, although this window is rapidly closing. Investing at this stage would give the investors the opportunity to participate in future funding rounds, and to position the company for a global exit event.
2. How much capital should be raised? How much equity should be given up in exchange for the investment?
$3 million in capital is needed to fund expansion into global markets and to pay off the FBDB loan immediately. However, the founders should be careful not to underestimate the capital required for this expansion; it would not want to have to return to investors for an additional investment because it had underestimated costs.
The present day valuation of Xantrex is $11.9 million, assuming an exit event in the year 2000, and that Mr. Elder’s experience that similar firms are able to achieve an 8x EBIT valuation in an exit event is correct. If this figure is used as the post-money valuation of Xantrex (because the company requires this expansion financing to make an exit event possible), then the company should be willing and expect to relinquish roughly 25% of the firm’s equity in exchange for expansion financing ($3M/$11.9M, based on the ‘most likely’ sales estimates agreed upon by the company Mr. Elder).
3. Would you recommend that Management proceed with the contemplated BDC deal? Explain.
The option on the table from BDC is to proceed with a roughly $3M investment (comprised of $1.5M from BDC itself and $1.5M from the Working Opportunities Fund). This investment would take the form of common or preferred shares (i.e. an equity investment). This investment would meet Xantrex’s targets of acquiring additional capital as well management expertise from which to draw for international expansion. The founders are willing to give up some of their equity to facilitate the investment, and the equity proposal is far less than majority control. Xantrex has a good working relationship with BDC and with Mr. Elder, who has many years of VC experience and deep industry connections with individuals having the electronics and marketing experience that Xantrex needs. Expanding the syndicate by bringing the WOF on board will expose Xantrex to additional expertise. We therefore recommend that Xantrex accept the BDC deal if they are confident that this investment will be sufficient to see them through to an exit event in 2000. However, Xantrex should be aware that should they require future rounds of financing before a liquidity event, they will not be able to seek this funding from the BDC or WOF because both cap total investment at $5M. It could be difficult to attract new venture capital to buy out BDC’s interest, and/or could further dilute the equity stake of Xantrex’s founders.
4. What are the significant criteria and constraints employed by the investors?
BDC funding can take the form of equity, warrants, debentures, or convertible debentures, and because the firm is currently cash flush, is willing to accept a longer payback period (3-10 years).
The most likely investment partner is WOF, which cannot use debt instruments in investments and which may have a shorter payback period arising from a more immediate need for cash flows than BDC. BDC’s target rate of return is 20-35% and both BDC and WOF typically cap investments at $5M. Both firms would require Xantrex to prepare a shareholder’s agreement, and would reasonably expect board representation.
5. Structure an ‘optimal’ deal that would meet investor criteria and Xantrex’s objectives and requirements. Summarize the major terms and any key clauses Xantrex should seek to include in a Shareholder’s Agreement.
The major terms that should be included in a shareholder’s agreement are summarized below (note this a non-exhaustive list).
Investment Structure: $3M investment comprised of $1.5M each from WOF and BDC. Investment will be in exchange for preferred shares (convertible to common shares upon a qualified IPO, or upon approval or the majority of preferred shareholders) amounting to 25% equity ownership of the company.
Capitalization Table:
Pre-money valuation $8,900,000
Investment $3,000,000
Post-money valuation $11,900,000 (11,900,000 shares)
% Equity = ($3,000,000/$11,900,000 = ~25%, or 3,000,000 shares @ $1/share to the investors)
Board of Directors: Shall be composed of 5 individuals: two founders, one investor representative, and two individuals mutually agreeable to both parties. The audit committee and compensation committee shall include investor and founder representation.
Liquidation Event: The company will seek a liquidation event (merger, reorganization or other transaction in which control of the company is transferred) within 5 years (IPO, sale, or sale of investor interests).
Antidilution Provisions: Investors preferred shares shall be subject to weighted average antidilution protection; no adjustment shall be made for share issuance to employees etc. for board-approved equity incentive plans.
Investor approval: Required for a liquidation event. Investors shall also retain rights of first refusal in the event of one or more of the founders seeking to liquidate (part of) their equity standing.
Performance Targets: The investment is structured around a $50M sales target by the year 2000. If this is not achieved, one of the independent directors shall be replaced by an investor representative.
Good analysis - I also agree that Xantrex should pursue the deal; however, I do question a few of the terms that you have recommended Xantrex should seek when negotiating the deal.
ReplyDeleteIn particular, you recommend including a term that dictates a $50M sales target by the year 2000. Unless explicitly requested by the investor, I would not propose this term, as failing to meet that financial objective will surrender further control to the investor.
Furthermore, I would revise the terms relating to the Board of Directors and Compensation Committee to be more favourable to Xantrex. According to your analysis, Xantex should offer approximately 25% of its equity to the investor. Instead of allowing the investor to assign one board director and influence the selection of two others, Xantrex can make a good case that the investor may only select one board director and not influence the selection of others, ensuring that Xantrex retains more control of the company. Furthermore, Xantrex should refrain from recommending that the investor is involved in the compensation committee.
Finally, I would not recommend that Xantrex propose committing to a liquidation event within 5 years. Committing to a liquidation event time frame can limit Xantrex's future options.
Nancy, Rhonda, and John,
ReplyDeleteI really liked your recommendations overall. Very clear and you seemed to hit on all the key points. I really liked that you pointed out that Xantrex keep in mind that the BDC and WOF investors may be limited by their $5M cap if they are to need larger future financing. Given their plan for rapid global growth, its quite possible that if they are succeeding internationally, raising an even larger amount of money in a subsequent round so they can take market share quickly seems quite feasible.
On the flip side, I think that you could recommend a slightly smaller amount of capital (and therefore retain more ownership for the owners) if you were to leverage other cash facilities available. For example, with the financing, they would be able to renegotiate their operating line of credit for a larger amount, up to $1million. Also, they could get more aggressive with accounts receivable (particularly with Sorenson, who is paying late), and work to reduce inventory, they could improve their cash flow and reduce their need for capital.
My only other comment is that it wasn't clear in your posting how you arrived at the $11.9M valuation? It seems in the right ballpark, just not clear if you just used the 8x EBIT method or not.
Cheers,
Gord E.
Very good Analysis.
ReplyDeleteI think one of the points to note about the stage in which the Xantrex management/board is in, at the time of the case, is getting towards a point at which they would have to plan on an exit strategy for investors, be it sale or IPO. As such it is important to protect current majority and minority shareholder rights. Some of the following points in the deal would aid both groups:
Pre-emptive rights
-Current shareholders have the first right to buy any newly issued shares. This protects the stake of current shareholders and investors
Disposal of Shares
-To get the most value for shares when there is no public market for the shares an agreement must be put forward. The majority shareholder has a 'carry-along' right where the shares must be sold on the same terms in the event of a purchase. This protects against minorty shareholders 'holding out' on a sale of the company
Agreement of Purchase and Sale
-Upon an agreement shareholders are obligated to either buy shares of other shareholders or sell to other shareholders. This helps to complete the sale agreeement. Shares shall be valued on a consensus method.
Liquidation Provision
-Shotgun clause is available. If a key member of the management exits the company or a major company event occurs the board can trigger liquidation.
Approval of agreements and modification to shareholder agreements
-A 2/3 agreement is needed of shareholders
Resolution of Disputes
-An arbitrator may resolve disputes that are not under the jurisdiction of the board of directors
Although, all shareholders share an optimism of high returns, all investors should be protected against the actions of the minority in the case of an exit strategy. In order not to derail a Board directed exit and proceed expeditiously with the transaction.
Regards,
Sameer
Very nice work.
ReplyDeleteMy comments are:
Part 1
Although this is somewhat a moot point due to the amount of information and details provided in the case, I question what value of the term loan remains to be paid back and your assumption that the entire $600k remains outstanding. Although the case does not clearly explain how this loan has been received and what specific amount remains outstanding, the financial statements indicate $18,000 term loan as of December 31st, 1995 (but gives no detailed explanation). Perhaps straight line amortization could have been assumed and then about $400,000 would remain but as you suggest, it is possible that the entire principle is still outstanding as well.
I agree with your calculation of the interest premium on the projected best case sales presented but it may have been worthwhile to also calculate this value for early payment on the original agreed sales values. The difference would then show the amount Xantrex would save in interest premiums through early payment, and help assure them that early payment was a financially sound decision. Note that you would also have to add the interest on principle savings to determine the total benefit of prepaying the loan. Also, it should be noted that it is the amount of interest premiums on the original agreed sales that is due for early payment, not on the new projected best case sales. The difference in interest premiums is the risk Xantrex is trying to mitigate through early payment.
I agree with your risk assessment from Xantrex's perspective but believe they also have risks related to being able to renegotiate their current bank covenants. The expansion they are planning will require a high annual spend on capital assets than they are currently allowed, and there is also a cap on management salary. As you noted, Xantrex realizes it will need additional management skill and this may not be possible under the current terms.
Part 2
ReplyDeleteWith respect to the investor's risk, I don't believe Xantrex being able to meet the projected best case sales is necessary as Brian Elder of BDC had floated the investment offer based upon their agreed most likely and worst case scenario projections. Therefore, meeting best case sales would be a bonus return to his firm and he would expect to earn returns as per his expected case sales.
I agree that the amount of capital to be raised is in the range of $3 million but you do not provide a breakdown of how you arrived at this value? Perhaps showing the specific amounts would be helpful for a deeper understanding of your analysis. Further, I think you need to clarify you PV of $11.9 million being for the year 2000. The PV of the company as of January 1996 should include PV of cash flows (perhaps represented by EBITDA), as well as the terminal value of 8 x EBIT. This value can be compared to the current $3 million investment to determine the pre or post money investment, which gives an indication of what percentage of the firm the VC's are investing. The percentage of the firm offered should then reflect the investor's desired IRR based upon their cash flows (investment in year 1996 and payout in 2000).
With respect to recommending that Xantrex accept the VC's offer, I like that you noted some potential risk in the event that sales growth does not meet expectations and they need to look for additional financing. Did you consider the difference in best, expected and worst case sales? Perhaps the operating line, increased through renegotiation with the bank, would be sufficient to mitigate this risk? Also, explicitly listing significant criteria and constraints would help to assess the optimal deal structure (e.g. Xantrex was required to create a Board of Directors and WOF would not accept debt financing).
I like the deal you have structured and the general presentation of your Shareholder's Agreement, especially the performance target that allows the VC's additional power on the board if sales projections are not met. It seems to be a fair balance between the concerns of the company and investors, such that both parties would find it agreeable. I wonder if Xantrex would propose such a covenant or hope that VC's did not bring it up? :D
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ReplyDeleteIt is very detailed analysis. The recommendations for the top management are based on thorough analysis of corporative risks. The suggestion to increase the operative line of credit threefold for the investments should be very attractive for Xantrex. However, I have some comments. I think your pre-money valuation $8900 in capitalization table (Q 5) was over-estimated at use multiplier 8xEBIT for the BDC exit from firms like Xantrex. In the terms of attractiveness of Series A Preferred shares, the non-cumulative dividends should be preferred to any other dividends on the Common Stock. Also, I think that rule of conversion of shares should be included into structure of “optimal deal” (Q5), particularly in the situation when Xantrex’s shares are not on the public market: ratio at the automated conversion of the Series A Preferred into shares of Common Stock at the then applicable conversion price and upon the closing of a firmly underwritten public offering. That will protect the company against contradiction of the interests of majority and minority shareholders.
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